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Abstract 
 
The Cost of New Entry (CONE) for an Advanced Combined Cycle 
Power Plant Into the ERCOT Market 
 
Jeremy Ronald Zaborowski, MSEER 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2014 
 
Supervisor:  Michael Webber 
 
The Texas ERCOT market is one of the most open, deregulated electricity 
markets in the world. This open market brought electricity costs down for Texas residents 
and businesses, creating a much more competitive economic climate. However, these low 
prices currently generate insufficient revenue for generators to finance construction of 
new or replacement generation assets. In the instance of combined cycle advanced natural 
gas, the Independent Market Monitor 2012 annual report estimated that a plant needed to 
generate 2.5 times as much as revenue it did in 2012 to incent new generation.  
This author argues that while the gap is still significant, the continuous changes to 
the ERCOT market since its inception make an historical examination like that used by 
the IMM less accurate. New market rules such as price caps or changes in fuel markets 
through new technologies like hydraulic fracturing create a very different valuation gap 
than a model based on historical activity alone. This analysis attempts to get a more 
accurate approximation of the gap through the use of publicly traded futures contracts for 
natural gas and electricity. Electricity futures reflect market expectations of revenue 
 vi 
based on current and future market rules. Gas futures reflect price expectations in light of 
market changes like fracturing, potential LNG exports, and other changes. Financial 
positions can be maintained in both markets to give a fixed rate of return. Using this 
method, one can create a very conservative valuation model that still more accurately 
reflects market sentiment. 
This thesis starts with a brief history of ERCOT deregulation from the early 2000s 
to present in order to clarify for the reader the changes that have taken place in the 
market. It then demonstrates the futures-valuation model using an advanced combined 
cycle power plant as an example.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This study explores the impact historically low gas prices are having on ERCOTs 
electrical grid. Specifically, it values a hypothetical combined cycle power plant project 
and examines the gap between capital and operations costs and market revenues. It starts 
with a history of deregulation in Texas’ electricity market and a brief explanation of its 
current structure. It then discusses some of the proposed changes facing the market. It 
then moves a hypothetical power plant valuation. Chapter three outlines the methodology 
for the valuation; 10-year gas and electricity futures market prices are used as low-risk 
proxies for actual spot prices that have yet to occur. Using this methodology, chapter four 
provides the results from this analysis, including what futures prices for both natural gas 
and electricity must be for new investment. 
The move by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas’ (ERCOTs) to a 
deregulated market has largely been successful at achieving ERCOTs goal; electricity 
prices slowed or fell for most areas and industries in Texas. High participation rates of 
end-users, especially commercial and industrial users, in selecting their preferred retail 
electric provider (REP) rather than their default REP was seen as another indicator of the 
new market’s success. 
Renewable generators, wind power in particular, substantially altered market 
pricing due to government incentives and the fact they do not have fuel costs. As Newell 
notes, it is estimated that wind accounts for 9 percent of Texas capacity, on average.1 
However, at off-peak periods, it has produced as much as 40 percent of systemwide 
1 Newell, Samuel et al., The Brattle Group, ERCOT Investment Incentives and Resource 
Adequacy, June, 2012. Available from: 
http://www.ercot.com/content/news/presentations/2012/Brattle%20ERCOT%20Resource%20Adequacy%2
0Review%20-%202012-06-01.pdf. Accessed 22 October 2012, pp15-16. 
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demand.2 Because of this, many natural gas plants that often may have provided base-
load regularly now fulfill the role of peaking facilities, quickly ramping up generation in 
times of need from the grid and ramping back down when redundant. Natural gas’ 
moderately low price at this time, unique role as the main fuel source for Texas electricity 
generation – 45.4 percent of Texas’s electricity came from natural gas in 20103 – and its 
relatively low emissions also increase the importance of gas-fired power plants to the 
state4.  
Gas’ unique position in Texas electricity also creates a very strong correlation in 
pricing between electricity and natural gas prices. History demonstrates this 
phenomenon; as natural gas prices rose and fell in response to events like Hurricane 
Katrina, electricity prices showed similar price spikes5. Wind, nuclear, and coal, usually 
the cheapest generation sources, provide the base load for Texas. As power demands 
increase, gas plants come online. The newest, most advanced combined-cycle gas power 
plants can reach full generation capacity in less than fifteen minutes, compared to more 
than 24 hours for some coal-fired power plants. Base-load have fairly consistent costs, 
keeping the market steady, but these natural gas plants at the margin have very different 
heat rates from one another. When demand rises, the less efficient, more expensive 
generation assets ramp up, raising electricity prices.  For these reasons, it is important to 
understand the impact of low natural gas prices and current ERCOT market forces on the 
ability to build new generation to meet demand.  
2 http://www.ercot.com/news/press_releases/show/26611 
3 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-923, "Power Plant Operations 
Report" and predecessor forms. Table 5. Electric Power Industry Generation by 
Primary Energy Source, 1990 Through 2010 (Megawatthours). Available from: 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/Texas/. Accessed 23 November 2012. 
4 Newell, Samuel et al., 2012, pp.15-16. 
5 Ibid., p17. 
 2 
                                                 
Chapter 2: A Brief History of the Relationship between Natural Gas 
and Texas’ Deregulated Electricity Market 
CALIFORNIA DEREGULATION 
Prior to market reform in 1998, three integrated investor-owned utilities (IOUs) 
owned or controlled 75 percent of California’s power market. Pacific Gas and Electric 
(PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE) and San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E) 
provided integrated power services, from wholesale power generation to transmission and 
distribution to individual customers. Subject to California Public Utility Commission’s 
(CPUC) rate-of-return regulation that allows IOUs to charge rates high enough to recoup 
costs as well as a reasonable rate of return. While California electricity had very high 
reliability, it also had the highest retail electric costs in the country. Prices in the early 90s 
averaged $60 per megawatt hour (MWh) for embedded generation costs in California, 
compared to $17/MWh at the California-Oregon Border for out-of-state power.6 
In an effort to address high electricity costs, the CPUC phased in deregulating 
policies, injecting market forces into the industry to create competition and reduce prices. 
Over the course of the early 90s, CPUC implemented a competitive bidding process for 
all new generation capacity. In 1995, they required all IOUs unbundle generation from 
transmission and distribution services. All generators would have access to the California 
transmission and distribution (T&D) network for a fee approved by the CPUC. 
Generators would compete on generation price for business. The cheapest generation 
plants would be the first to energize the grid while the plants demanding the highest 
prices would only come on for peaking needs. 
6 Woo, Chi-Keung. “What went wrong in California’s electricity market?” Energy., 26 (2001). 
747-758. 
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Finally, in 1996, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill 1890 (AB1890), 
legislating some of the rules put in place by CPUC. AB1890 included the following 
elements: 
 
(a) A retail rate freeze at the 1996 level so that the difference between the average 
embedded cost for generation and the wholesale market price would help pay for the 
IOUs’ stranded generation cost. The freeze for an IOU would last till March 31, 2002; 
unless the IOU had fully recovered its generation stranded cost before this date. 
(b) An immediate rate reduction of 10 percent for residential and small commercial 
ratepayers. The financing of the rate reduction is through the issuance of ‘rate reduction 
bonds’ to be repaid by a charge on retail consumption. 
(c) Continued funding for low-income ratepayer assistance programs, public purpose 
programs for public goods research, development and demonstration, demand-side 
management and renewable electric generation technologies. 
(d) Incentives for the IOUs to divest their fossil-fuel generation units. 
(e) Retention of ownership (but not control) of T&D assets by the IOUs. 
(f) Creation of a non-profit [Power Exchange] PX to operate the wholesale energy 
markets. 
(g) Creation of a non-profit ISO to manage and operate the California grid.7 
In the end, it changed California’s grid system from a collaboration of regulators 
and vertically-integrated IOUs into a non-integrated 5-level system. With the new 
system, (1) regulators created a (2) wholesale energy market where buyers and generators 
bought and sold power on a trading floor. (3) Independent system operators (ISOs), 
formerly the State’s IOUs, made these wholesale energy transactions on the market. (4) 
T&D companies, still regulated by rate-of-return (now called price cap) regulation, 
managed transmission infrastructure and ensured open access to their power lines. 
Finally, at the consumer end of the distribution chain, (5) they created a retail market that 
allowed retail customers to freely choose their preferred power provider. While the 
system was undoubtedly more complicated, it injected competition into two different 
7 Ibid, pp. 751-752. 
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areas – generator trading and retail choice – allowing free market forces to influence the 
major components of power. . 
Once fully phased in, the new system initially improved costs without 
substantially hurting reliability. The incentive to divest power generation was initially 
effective, inducing the big three IOUs to sell off 10 percent of their generating capacity 
by May of 1999. Two power exchanges (PX) markets were created, one for present-day 
pricing (the day-of market) and one for pricing the next day (the next-day market). 
Between 1998 and 2000, customers mainly noticed nothing but price stabilization in their 
electricity bills. While prices continued to rise, they did so at a flattened rate. 
However, in January 2001, clear issues with the system arose. The rate freeze 
initially helped the IOUs, especially PG&E and SCE, to pay off some of their stranded 
costs. However, summer prices during 2000 spiked, straining PG&E and SCE capital 
reserves and eventually causing them both to become financially insolvent by January 
2001. Although incenting divesture of generating capacity attracted new power 
companies to the California generation market beyond the big three, it still had only 10 
primary wholesalers with a tight demand market, ensuring generators nearly any price 
demanded in trading. Since PG&E and SCE were still such dominant generators and 
continued to operate under rate freezes, and since electricity demand is largely price 
insensitive, the power demands of the overall market were consequently price-insensitive 
as well. 
The IOUs were also required by the CPUC to buy from the PX and ISO markets. 
These purchasing requirements combined with a largely inelastic electricity demand 
market and ever-dwindling reserve capacity made the market incredibly vulnerable to 
price spikes. Even mild shortages caused heavy competition by IOUs seeking additional 
capacity on the PX and ISO markets. This situation caused prices to spike much earlier in 
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the demand curve than was sustainable for IOUs. Additionally, as Stoft notes, 
California’s exchange-only operated in energy quantity and price and did not account for 
startup and no-load costs, causing gaming to the system.8 
The market was made even more vulnerable to sustained price hikes because it 
lacked any forward market. Without the option to lock in pricing agreements for extended 
periods of time, IOUs were unable to hedge against changes in fuel prices, market 
dynamics, etc. If contracts had been allowed, utilities might have been able to lock in 
$60/MWh pricing rather than the spikes plaguing the market that reached as high as 
$750/MWh for non-peak power.  
Finally, the trading options limitations of either day-of or next-day pricing in 
direct sequence made the next-day trading all but useless. Sellers would offer high next-
day prices, knowing that if the offers were not accepted they would be able to go back the 
next day and offer it on the day-of exchange. If the offer was accepted, it usually did not 
provide strong price hedging. 
DEREGULATED TEXAS 
Much like California, ERCOT historically consisted of a few major, vertically-
integrated power providers that dominated the market.9 These included Texas Utilities 
Electric Company (now TXU), Houston Lighting and Power Company (now split into 
Reliant Energy and CenterPoint Energy), Central and Southwest Corporation (now 
merged with American Electric Power Company), and Texas-New Mexico Power 
Company. In addition to these private companies, 60 electric cooperatives and nearly 50 
8 Stoft, Power System Economics. p. 88 
9 Zarnikau, Jay. “A Review of Efforts to Restructure Texas’ Electricity Market.” Energy Policy 
33, no. 1  
(January 2005): 15–25. doi:10.1016/S0301-4215(03)00193-9. p. 15. 
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municipalities were permitted to provide Transmission/Distribution Service providers 
(TDSP) and Retail Electric Providers (REP) services, respectively. 
The majority of Texas power is managed by the Electric Reliability Council of 
Texas (ERCOT). Texans established ERCOT to manage reliability and cost of the state’s 
electrical grid. It does so by encouraging interconnectedness, coordinating power 
provider activities, and facilitating power transfers between generators during 
emergencies.10  
Even as California began to face challenges with their deregulated system in the 
late 90s, Texas enacted legislation in 2002 that mirrored California’s framework in a lot 
of ways. Under Senate Bill 7 (SB7), most retail electricity providers (REPs) were allowed 
to choose their investor-owned utilities (IOUs). Vertically integrated providers were 
required to separate operations into distinct business units for generation, transmission 
and distribution service providers(TDSP), and REP. TDSP operations still required 
regulation in acknowledgement that of their natural monopolistic role.11 Municipalities, 
rural electric cooperatives and other non-IOUs were granted the ability to continue their 
existing monopolistic position, but with the caveat that should they decide to open their 
retail power market to competition in the future they would be unable to go back to a 
monopolistic market. These operators were labeled non opt-in entities (NOIEs). 
Price caps and market rules were used for both generation and REP in order to 
ensure a certain level of reliability and reduce market manipulation. Without price caps 
for instance, generators could be incented to intentionally withhold capacity until such a 
time as prices spike to lucrative levels. However, beyond these basic safeguards, REP and 
10  Ibid, p. 16. 
11 Zarnikau, Jay, and Doug Whitworth. “Has Electric Utility Restructuring Led to Lower 
Electricity Prices for Residential Consumers in Texas?” Energy Policy 34, no. 15 
(October 2006): 2191–2200. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2005.03.018. p. 2191. 
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generation ran mainly unregulated to ensure market influences acted as the main price 
determinant.12  
The Public Utility Commission (PUC) reviewed and approved rate cases from 
these utilities in an effort to control costs until deregulation legislation took full effect in 
2001-2002, at which point rate cases only applied to TDSP services. Rate cases would be 
approved at prices that would “permit utilities a reasonable opportunity to recover their 
reasonable and necessary costs of business and earn a reasonable return on prudent 
investments”.13  
While California and Texas shared many parts of their electricity deregulatory 
policy, it is useful here to discuss some major differences. In deregulating, California saw 
a risk of destabilizing reliability. They felt a competitive market would demonstrate an 
increased willingness to accept greater load-release events in exchange for greater 
returns. There is nothing deceptive or criminal in this calculus – it is simply rational 
behavior for a company seeking to maximize profits. As Milstein and Tishler note, 
“instead of building new capacity that will be idle during most of the year, electricity 
producers let the electricity price spike.”14 This allows greater profits on existing assets 
rather than moderate profits on a greater number of assets. California therefore instituted 
a reserve capacity requirement, internalizing the cost of reliability that the market might 
rationally avoid. REPs were required to incorporate a portion of their rate to use for 
development or access to additional reserve capacity. 
Texas regulators also saw reliability challenges in deregulation. In contrast 
however, ERCOT relied on an “energy-only” market to both lower operations costs and 
12 Ibid, p. 2191. 
13 Ibid, p. 2192. 
14 Milstein, Irena, and Asher Tishler. “The inevitability of capacity underinvestment in 
competitive electricity markets” Energy Economics., 34, (2012): 62-77.  
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drive additional capital investment. This model utilizes the price spikes on the spot 
market as an incentive to attract additional generation investment. While undoubtedly 
more volatile than a market with regulated reserves, the hope was that overall prices 
would be lower as the market determined more accurate cost structures than the regulator, 
no matter how sophisticated, may derive. While a few other markets around the globe 
operated under similar principles (notably Alberta, Canada and Australia), ERCOT is 
unique in the United States. In this way ERCOT acted as a test-case for the country. 
As such, Texas’ deregulatory framework was heavily praised from the onset. It 
had one of the highest switchover rates of any state. By October 2004, about 67 percent 
of industrial load users, 54 percent of commercial users, and nearly 20 percent of 
residential users offered the choice had switched to a different retail provider.15  
In addition to heavy adoption by residents and especially businesses, cost savings 
have materialized. In the Annual Baseline of Choice in Canada and the United States, 
ERCOT has been recognized as the most competitive retail market in North America for 
the last three years (2009-2011).16 The evidence suggests the new framework has been 
particularly advantageous for large power users. This is intuitive. Large users demand 
significant load and require significantly less support from power companies relative to 
residential customers. They are more sophisticated users and more open to new cost-
cutting methods. It is less expensive to pursue these customers rather than market to a 
wide residential audience. The effort to attract the power load of a single industrial plant 
versus the thousands of homes using the equivalent power make it clear the most 
competition between REPs will come in trying to land these big customers. Indeed, larger 
15 Zarnikau, 2006, p. 2192. 
16 2011 Scope of Competition in Electric Markets in Texas, Public Utility Commission of Texas, 
January 2011, p. 49.available from: http://www.treia.org/assets/documents/reports-and-
studies/puc.scopeofcompetitionreport2011.elec.pdf. Accessed 8 December 2012 
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users frequently had as many as 10 REPs providing competitive pricing options to lure 
their business and secure a major portion of REP load.17 Only a few retailers targeted 
residential load. 
As deregulation began to take root in Texas, retailers did not compete as much for 
smaller users, especially residential customers. This is in part due to market forces 
discussed above, but it is also due to Price to Beat (PTB) rules regarding switching to 
other REPs. PTB rules limit the ability to garner substantial savings. Texas restructuring 
rules required an automatic 6 percent discount as the PTB benchmark for potential 
competitors for the first five years (until January 1, 2004). Affiliate REPs (AREPs) were 
permitted to charge lower rates after 36 months or once they lost at least 40 percent of 
their residential and small commercial load to competitors. Only at this point did the PTB 
become a ceiling rather than a benchmark, allowing AREPs to offer lower prices.18 Any 
consumer purchasing over 1 MW annually received no price cap protection. The 2003 
PUC Scope of Competition report detailed the smaller success of deregulation on 
residential rates, estimating that of the $902 million in savings realized by residential 
users in 2002, one fourth was due to the 6 percent discount and the remainder was due 
solely to lower fuel costs.19 Even after the 6 percent discount expired, REPs found the 
transaction and marketing costs to reach this cohort price them out of the market. Even 
so, the report confirmed that deregulation had a net positive effect on pricing. Changes in 
the fuel market compounded those savings. 
17 Zarnikau, 2006, p. 2192. 
18 Ibid, p. 2193. 
19 2003 Scope of Competition in Electric Markets in Texas, Public Utility Commission of Texas, 
January 2004, p. 83. available from: 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/Texaspuc_Comp.elec.markets.report_1-03.pdf. 
Accessed 8 December 2012 
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THE IMPACT OF FRACKING ON ELECTRICITY PRICE 
 The newfound ability to extract natural gas from unconventional sources 
such as the tight shale found in the Bend arch-Fort Worth basin dramatically increased 
domestic natural gas production, completely changing commodity market forces, 
especially so in the US.  
Before hydraulic fracturing (fracking) matured, United States imports of liquid 
natural gas (LNG) grew steadily (see Figure 2.1), reaching a high of 4.6 tcf in 2007. 
Since that year, even as GDP grew, US imports of natural gas declined roughly 6.8 
percent annually, on average, equal to approximately 288 bcf less in natural gas imports 
per year.20 In 2010, imports equaled only 3.5 tcf. At this rate, it is projected that the 
United States could become a net exporter by 2035.21 In fact, in contrast to most 
developed countries and regions throughout the world, the impact of fracking suggests 
that North America as a whole may become net exporters of both oil and gas by 2030 
(see Figure 2.2). 
  
20 EIA, 2012. 
21 International Energy Agency (2012), World Energy Outlook 2012, OECD Publishing. 
doi: 10.1787/weo-2012-en , p.76. 
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Figure 2.1. Annual natural gas imports, 1973-201122 
 
Figure 2.2. Net oil and gas import dependency in selected countries projects23 
 
Natural gas prices declined dramatically as a consequence of the growing 
domestic supply. Before fracking began substantially impacting prices, natural gas cost 
22 U.S. Energy Information Administration, "US Natural Gas Imports". Available from: 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9100us2A.htm. Accessed 24 November 2012. 
23 International Energy Agency (2012), World Energy Outlook 2012, OECD Publishing. 
doi: 10.1787/weo-2012-en. p. 76. 
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between $5 and $7 dollars per MMBtu with natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina 
causing sporadic spikes as high as $13.42 (see Figure 2.3). In contrast, the highest spike 
since 2009 was January 2010’s average price of $5.83/MMBtu. Prices have stayed well 
below this price point since then, hitting historic lows of $1.95/MMBtu in April 2012 and 
staying below $4.00/MMBtu for over a year. As of October 2012, spot prices averaged 
$3.32/MMBtu.24  
Figure 2.3. Henry Hub gulf coast natural gas spot price by month, 1997-201225 
  
As spot prices declined and forward contracts expired for national utilities, natural 
gas costs in electricity generation also declined (see Figure 2.4.) After hitting an average 
high of $9.01 for the year 2008, prices have more than halved, with a 2012 year-to-date 
average of $3.16. Additionally, over the same 2008-2012 time period, natural gas 
generation capacity grew 3.9 percent, or 15.6 gigawatts. The only other fossil fuel-based 
generator to grow was coal (by 5.9 gigawatts) over that same time period, but only by 1.9 
percent (see Figure 2.5). 
24 EIA, 2012. 
25 U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Henry Hub Gulf Coast Natural Gas Spot 
Price". Available from: http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdm.htm. 
Accessed 24 November 2012. 
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Figure 2.4. Average natural gas costs for electricity and heat production, 1998-201226 
Low gas prices continue to impact Texas. After generation using natural gas 
peaked at 199.5 gigawatt hours (GWh) in 2007, it declined until 2011 when new facilities 
came online to take advantage of new pricing (see Figure 2.6). Between 2010 and 2011, 
13.6 additional GWh of natural gas-fired power was generated, bringing the state’s total 
natural gas generation in 2011 to 200.5 GWh. 
 
 
  
26 U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Electric Power Monthly June 2012". 
Available from: http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/pdf/chap4.pdf. Accessed 
24 November 2012. 
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Figure 2.5. Electric net summer capacity, 1949-201127 
 
Figure 2.6. Texas electricity generation from natural gas28 
 
27 U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Annual Energy Review, Table 8.11a 
Electric net summer capacity: Total (all sectors), 1949-2011 (sum of tables 8.11b 
and 8.11d; million kilowatts)". Available from: 
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/showtext.cfm?t=ptb0811a. Accessed 
24 November 2012. 
28 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-923, "Power Plant Operations 
Report" and predecessor forms. Table 5. Electric Power Industry Generation by 
Primary Energy Source, 1990 Through 2010 (Megawatthours). Available from: 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/Texas/. Accessed 23 November 2012. 
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As Zarnikau et al. points out, “it is difficult to analyze trends in the retail prices 
paid by commercial [or any other] sector electricity consumers in the ERCOT market 
because there is no public survey of retail prices quoted to commercial [or any other] 
sector electricity consumers.”29 However, by examining price quotes by competitive 
retail electric providers (CREPs) to load aggregators, a comparison of generation price 
and natural gas price can be made. Figure 2.7 demonstrates that this comparison shows a 
strong correlation between electricity generation and natural gas prices in Texas. Through 
regression it suggests that for every $1/MMBTU increase in natural gas price there is a 
corresponding wholesale electricity rate increase of $0.0054/kWh for Texas commercial 
users.30  
Figure 2.7. Texas commercial electricity generation price versus natural gas price31 
 
29 Zarnikau, Jay, Marilyn Fox, and Paul Smolen. “Trends in Prices to Commercial Energy 
Consumers in the Competitive Texas Electricity Market.” Energy Policy 35, no. 8 
(August 2007): 4332–4339. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2007.02.024. p. 4334. 
30 Zarnikau et al, 2007, p. 4335. 
31 Ibid, p.4335. 
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REGULATORY EFFORTS TO INCREASE RESERVE 
Even though savings were not as great as expected for residential users, the 
market has become much more efficient and cost-effective overall. As Figure 2.8 
demonstrates, the marginal cost of generation for wholesale generators operating within 
the ERCOT market stays below the cost curve of other major markets, notably the 
Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM) and the California 
Independent System Operator (CAISO). The marginal cost of generation simply forecasts 
how price changes relative to supply. Generally, generation costs stay flat until they 
approach the last 5%-10% of capacity, at which point they quickly balloon. Whereas 
these other markets have to charge greater than $50/MWh as early as 70 percent of 
capacity for CAISO and 90 percent of capacity for PJM, the ERCOT cost curve does not 
go above $30/MWh until the market approaches 98 percent of capacity. This hyper-
efficiency is great for market efficiency and consumer pricing but it impacts reliability. 
Energy pricing margins have been so dramatically impacted that analysts in 2012 felt 
equilibrium (the amount of generation the market would support) would only create an 8 
percent reserve (see Figure 2.9).  
To keep ERCOT reliably meeting Texas power demand, some level of reserve 
capacity must exist to maintain power in times of need. This means that in any given day, 
a portion of generation capacity sits prepared to produce power. This is done primarily to 
manage unusually high demand on the system or unexpected plant drop-offs. Extremely 
cold or hot days often are the culprit, pushing heating or air conditioning systems to draw 
additional load from the system. When this happens, the reserve margin is there to meet 
it. Otherwise, rolling blackouts would need to be instituted to keep ERCOTs grid from 
collapsing under the additional demand. This is exactly what happened in January 2011 
as an unusually cold day froze controls on some natural gas pipelines, shutting down 
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7,000 megawatts of power generators at the same time as demand for power to heat 
homes escalated.32 
Figure 2.8. ERCOT power generator supply and price versus the Pennsylvania-New 
Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM) and California Independent System 
Operator (CAISO)33 
 
  
32 Baltimore, Chris. Texas weathers rolling blackouts as mercury drops, February 2011. 
Reuters. Available from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/02/us-ercot-
rollingblackots-idUSTRE7116ZH20110202. Accessed 26 November 2012. 
33 Newell, Samuel et al., The Brattle Group, ERCOT Investment Incentives and Resource 
Adequacy, June, 2012. Available from: 
http://www.ercot.com/content/news/presentations/2012/Brattle%20ERCOT%20R
esource%20Adequacy%20Review%20-%202012-06-01.pdf. Accessed 22 
October 2012. p.18. 
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Figure 2.9. Reserve margin equilibrium, June 201234 
 
However, since reserve margin power generation supply generates infrequently, 
higher energy prices are required to recoup costs. As of early 2013, ERCOTs regulatory 
market, efficient power generation portfolio and low gas prices were not providing 
energy prices high enough to support ERCOT’s target reserve margin of 13.75 percent. In 
fact, Newell and the Brattle Group forecast that current policy and peak offer price caps 
of $3,000 are only sufficient for maintaining a reserve margin of only 6 percent. With the 
price cap now raised to $9,000, the reserve margin is estimated at 10 percent, still well 
below the target of ERCOT. A 10 percent reserve margin translates roughly into “one 
load-shed event per year with an expected duration of two-and-a-half-hours, and thirteen 
such events in a year with a heat wave as severe as the one in 2011.”35 Needless to say, 
34 Ibid, .p. 5. 
35 Newell, Samuel et al., The Brattle Group, ERCOT Investment Incentives and Resource 
Adequacy, June, 2012. Available from: 
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outages of this magnitude could dramatically impact the Texas economy as well as public 
welfare. 
ERCOT and the PUC are well aware of the unique challenges facing the Texas 
electricity market. In 2012, the Brattle Group completed a study commissioned by 
ERCOT. ERCOT tasked them with determining the major factors discouraging 
generation investment, forecasting the market outlook on resource adequacy, and 
providing policy options for encouraging investment that meets long-term resource 
adequacy.36 This led to the aforementioned price cap increase for peak power from 
$3,000 to its current rate of $9,000. In all, Brattle gave five policy recommendation 
options that ranged from heavily market-based solutions to heavily regulation-oriented 
solutions (see Figure 2.10). They found that in addition to the efficiency of generation 
resources and the low cost of fuels, investors saw heightened risk due to the inability of 
generators to lock in long-term contracts.  
  
http://www.ercot.com/content/news/presentations/2012/Brattle%20ERCOT%20R
esource%20Adequacy%20Review%20-%202012-06-01.pdf. Accessed 22 
October 2012. p. 3. 
36 Newell, Samuel et al., The Brattle Group, Summary of “ERCOT Investment Incentives 
and Resource Adequacy”, July, 2012. Available from: Newell, Samuel et al., The 
Brattle Group, ERCOT Investment Incentives and Resource Adequacy, June, 
2012. Available from: 
http://www.ercot.com/content/news/presentations/2012/Brattle%20ERCOT%20R
esource%20Adequacy%20Review%20-%202012-06-01.pdf Accessed 26 
November 2012. 
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Figure 2.10. Brattle Group policy scenarios for ERCOT37 
 
Power plants are multi-decade investments and any change to the market can 
create huge stranded costs for the generator, limiting their ability to meet their debt 
obligations. This volatility is causing investors to exact greater returns, shorter payoff 
terms, and higher capitalization thresholds from owners. To surpass the 10 percent 
reserve PUC achieved by increasing the peak price cap, Brattle suggests two investor-
37 Newell, Samuel et al., The Brattle Group, ERCOT Investment Incentives and Resource 
Adequacy, June, 2012. Available from: 
http://www.ercot.com/content/news/presentations/2012/Brattle%20ERCOT%20Resource%20Ad
equacy%20Review%20-%202012-06-01.pdf. Accessed 22 October 2012. p. 118. 
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oriented solutions; that is, two solutions reduced investor risk and encouraged additional 
investment.  
The first option creates a mandatory resource adequacy requirement for load 
serving entities (LSEs). In this scenario the PUC determines the appropriate adequacy 
requirements needed within each area of the state and requires the generators in that area 
to provide additional supply to meet those reserve requirements. These costs are 
ultimately born by the consumer.  
Generators could either buy or build the necessary capacity.38 In this scenario, 
regulators do not determine the retail price needed to meet reserve adequacy 
requirements. They take the reserve margin equation that already exists system-wide and 
calculate it regionally, accounting for transmission bottlenecks and differences in 
demand. The strength in this strategy is it still leaves the electrical system largely to 
market forces. LSEs are responsible for determining the best way to meet requirements 
while maintaining market competitiveness.  
This option would undoubtedly increase costs as generators either build or buy 
additional capacity. It would also add implementation and management costs. A multi-
year phase-in approach would be essential for lowering risk of stranded costs for 
investors and thereby encourage them to support additional generation development. 
However, it could prove a challenge to accurately develop multi-year resource adequacy 
parameters. Before 2010, ERCOT supported a 13.75 percent reserve margin. After the 
hot summer experienced in 2011, Brattle now estimates ERCOT would recommend a 
38 Newell, Samuel et al., The Brattle Group, ERCOT Investment Incentives and Resource 
Adequacy, June, 2012. Available from: 
http://www.ercot.com/content/news/presentations/2012/Brattle%20ERCOT%20R
esource%20Adequacy%20Review%20-%202012-06-01.pdf. Accessed 22 
October 2012. p. 112. 
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reserve of 15.25 percent just to maintain previous reliability standards.39 Passing this 
change onto LSEs creates a moving target for capacity reserves. Changes like this could 
keep investor risk high and discourage generation growth. Without very accurate phase-in 
allowances, investors might see returns eaten up by new margin requirements. The PUC 
would need to periodically review and adjust its policy, which would be complicated and 
likely politically-fraught.  
Even with the political and administrative challenges, this option is perhaps the 
least invasive from a regulatory perspective while still incenting additional generation 
capacity for the state. It acknowledges the rational and reasonable self-interested nature 
of competitive market forces, namely that of efficiency. It injects reliability into a system 
that favors price, creating a second system priority. It leaves self-interested businesses in 
the market alone to figure out the most profitable methods for following the rules.  
Brattle’s second option that lowers investor risk recommends adding a centralized 
forward capacity market to the resource adequacy requirement.40 In this scenario, 
ERCOT would not only require generators to meet reliability requirements but would 
also create an auction to support a forward capacity market. ERCOT would hold auctions 
to secure obligations from generators for power needs three to four years into the future. 
Within a given year, generators would provide power for the agreed price and volume. 
LSEs would still have the flexibility to produce that power themselves or to purchase it 
from another, lower cost provider. Incremental auctions would take place to manage 
unforeseen changes to demand.  
This is a useful system for many reasons. LSEs would be able to hedge for costs 
by self-supply or through bilateral forward contracting. This allows them to create 
39 Ibid, p.3. 
40 Ibid, p. 115. 
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longer-term plans and continues the exertion of market forces on the system. Investors 
could get multi-year forward contracts without causing stranded costs risks for REPs 
lacking captive load. Multi-year contracts lessen investor risk, spurring investment. 
Eliminating concerns regarding stranded costs reduces the regulatory expenses and 
phase-in periods often required to accommodate the need to amortize the costs of 
infrastructure built under a different paradigm. Creating a centralized, long-term auction 
makes monitoring and managing the system more straightforward and reduces risk of 
unforeseen events. With three to four years of planning ahead, ERCOT can maintain 
awareness of retiring plants or maintenance cycles well in advance of them causing 
curtailments. A centralized auction also increases transparency and limits the market 
power any individual or small group of businesses can exert on the market. 
Even with all the positives, this option would face many of the same 
disadvantages of the previous one. Administration costs would undoubtedly rise to 
support the addition of an auction market. Implementation costs such as phase-ins, 
scheme design and development, and market adaptation costs will also contribute to 
higher costs for a time. Market forces will also be muted to a degree. A guaranteed price 
combined with locking in fuel rates for a specific period of time could guarantee a 
generator a rate of return higher than a regulated market would typically allow with 
reasonable rate of return rules. ERCOT would have little or no recourse to adjust for 
these changes, though. It would provide another market mechanism for the industry, 
offsetting some of the cost and inefficiencies imposed by a regulatory scheme, but they 
do not appear to outweigh the burdens. 
That being said, the basic question still remains: what is the market gap for 
building a new power plant in ERCOT? 
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Chapter 3: Methodology  
IMM METHODOLOGY FOR VALUING NEW GENERATION  
Volatility in fuel prices and market rule changes create challenges for generators. 
As fuel prices rise, older, less efficient plants must bid higher prices to allow for the 
greater spark-spread on their costs and power prices. They pay more for fuel just like 
their competitors, but they must also purchase more fuel than their competitors to 
compensate for their lower efficiency. This added cost of production therefore widens the 
bid price gap between the most and least efficient plants, or those with strong real or 
financial fuel hedges. This widened price difference at the margin makes bidding more 
difficult in this area – bid too low and generate at a loss, but bid too high and pay 
carrying costs without any generation revenue.                     
A generator can mitigate this pricing challenge through long-term power-
purchasing contracts. A power purchasing agreement (PPA) between a buyer and 
generator creates consistent, predictable revenue for generators and predictable power 
costs for buyers. A PPA contract can be for 5, 10 or even 20 years, creating a very stable 
price for both parties. However, the generator still risks losses. Its plants operate in 
ERCOTs competitive real-time and day-ahead markets. If the bid prices in those markets 
are lower than is profitable for its plants to produce, the wholesale generator will buy 
from the market rather than generate. If the sum of the market price or producing power 
and the company’s carrying costs, overhead, etc. exceed the PPA, the company faces a 
loss. This reality keeps the long-term contract from eliminating all risk for the wholesale 
power generator and consequently, the debt holder. Even so, the PPA does still offer 
substantial, albeit not absolute, risk mitigation. 
ERCOTs Independent Market Monitor (IMM) recognizes these challenges and 
provides an estimate of required revenues to incent new generation investment by various 
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generation types. In its 2012, it lays out its methodology for determining whether net 
revenue suffices to incent new power generation in the following manner: 
 
Although most suppliers are likely to receive the bulk of their revenues through bilateral 
contracts, the spot prices produced in the real-time energy market should drive the 
bilateral energy prices over time and are appropriate to use for this evaluation. For 
purposes of this analysis, heat rates of 7 MMBtu per MWh for a combined cycle unit, 
10.5 MMBtu per MWh for a combustion turbine, and 9.5 MMBtu per MWh for a new 
coal unit were assumed. Variable operating and maintenance costs of $4 per MWh for 
the natural gas units and $5 per MWh for the coal unit and fuel and variable operating 
and maintenance costs of $8 per MWh for the nuclear unit were assumed. For purposes 
of this analysis, a total outage rate (planned and forced) of 10 percent was assumed for 
each technology.  
The energy net revenues are computed based on the generation weighted settlement point 
prices from the real-time energy market. Weighting the energy values in this way masks 
what may be very high locational values for a specific generator location. Some 
generators may also receive uplift payments because of their specific reliability 
contributions, either as a reliability must run, or through the reliability unit commitment. 
This source of revenue is not considered in this analysis. The analysis also includes 
simplifying assumptions that can lead to over-estimates of the profitability of operating in 
the wholesale market. The following factors are not explicitly accounted for in the net 
revenue analysis: (i) start-up costs, which can be significant; and (ii) minimum running 
times and ramp restriction, which can prevent the natural gas generators from profiting 
during brief price spikes. Despite these limitations, the net revenue analysis provides a 
useful summary of signals for investment in the wholesale market.41 
Spot prices are a clear driver of bilateral energy prices. Platts and other forecasters 
use them in their models. Investors use these forecasted prices to drive their forward 
contracts appetite. This in turn moves the contract prices towards forecasted prices, which 
were developed in part through spot price history.  
In regulated, stable markets, this is the best data to use to build valuation models. 
On the cost side, it shows proven operations and maintenance expenses, taxes and fuel 
costs. The majority of costs are fixed, especially with very efficient generation assets. For 
41 Potomac Economics, Ltd., 2012 State of the Market Report for the ERCOT Wholesale Electricity 
Markets. Pp 73-74. 
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instance, the EIA estimates that excluding fuel, an advanced combined cycle power plant 
built in 2013 would only have $3.27/MWh in variable operations and maintenance costs, 
compared to $15.37/kW-yr in fixed O&M costs. Additionally, power plants are becoming 
modular, with installable components, reducing unexpected site-specific engineering and 
design costs. Companies like General Electric accurately estimate the incremental cost of 
one more S107H combined cycle turbine system. Besides some site preparation and 
shipping and handling, costs are very predictable. 
Perhaps more important, historical market performance provides revenue-side 
data, especially heat rate, capacity factor, and electricity price data. It is one thing to 
estimate capacity factor using the plant’s expected competitiveness in the market, but it is 
altogether more useful to consider historical performance of a similar plant within 
ERCOT. Historical electricity prices are even more important. Electricity price varies 
widely between off-peak periods and times of scarcity. Due to congestion pricing, it can 
also vary widely between locations within Texas. Historical data within a specific load 
zone provides an exact data set for calculating generation revenues for a proposed 
generation asset. It captures both average pricing as well as the significant revenue 
generated from the $2,000 or $3,000 price spikes.  
USING A FUTURES-BASED VALUATION MODEL 
Historical performance carries many strengths, but especially within the ERCOT 
market, it is important to acknowledge some limitations. First, inefficient transmission 
management can create scarcity pricing situations in the market, causing price spikes. 
Note Figure 3.1 below. 
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Additionally, IMM research determined that a new combined cycle unit would 
need to generate net revenue of $105-$135 per kW-year, but only had revenues of 
approximately $42 per kW-year in 2012.42  
Figure 3.1. ERCOT Load Forecast Error43 
The IMM method also fails to account for market changes. ERCOT was 
deregulated over a decade ago, but it made many substantive changes to the market over 
the past five years, including adding an emergency response service in 2012 and 
incrementally raising the system-wide offer cap from $3,000/MWh in 2011 to its current 
price of $5,000. This cap will rise to $9,000 in summer 2015.44 Additionally, ERCOT 
created an operating reserve demand curve (ORDC) adder that started operating June 
42 Ibid., Page 77. 
43 Ibid., p.70 
44 ERCOT, “ERCOT News Release.” 
 28 
                                                 
2014. All of these changes add risk to any valuation of new construction using models 
based upon historical ERCOT pricing. 
Bondholders seek high risk-weighted returns. The more a generator can control 
risk, the easier it is to attract creditors. Contracting PPAs or selling financial positions 
guarantees a certain return, even if it falls well below the average spot price. Therefore, 
the IMMs estimate, while illustrative, fails to fully capture the ability of generators to 
control risk, and consequently their ability to attract capital. 
Furthermore, the IMM report only considers data from the past five years. Not 
only do each of these years operate under different market rules, but they also require 
some modeling to create enough time series data to amortize the high upfront capital 
costs of new entry. Some modeling is needed for any method – even futures only provide 
10 years of market trades, whereas debt service for generating assets can easily span 20, 
30 or even 40 years – but a short historical period that does not reflect the current market 
scheme brings challenges. 
This thesis instead uses futures contracts to determine cost of new entry (CONE) 
for an advanced combined cycle power plant. This model uses futures contracts rather 
than historical market activity for three reasons 1) it still provides a conservative, 
“guaranteed” rate of return for generators through a financial hedge while 2) 
incorporating investor sentiment on current market rules and ones that will be phased in 
shortly, and 3) adjusting for future natural gas prices, which are likely to change as the 
full impact of hydraulic fracturing becomes apparent.  
Especially at this point in the market’s history, this is a more reasonable approach 
to valuation in the ERCOT market. ERCOTs current market structure is less than four 
years old; the current nodal market began December, 2010. There is therefore little 
historical spot-price data to build ERCOTs price performance. This provides little data to 
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calibrate the IMM model. Additionally, the discussion on capacity and the future of 
ERCOT injects uncertainty. Will there be new revenue streams? Will the market structure 
change? I propose that this uncertain environment necessitates the estimation of revenues 
through forward contracts rather than historical spot prices. Future spot prices may not 
reflect historical prices. Indeed, if capacity is to increase the spot price must rise. The 
question then becomes, “what is the gap?” How far are current prices from those 
necessary to incent new generation? 
Admittedly, all of these weaknesses make it hard for any market participant to 
accurately estimate spot prices in the ERCOT market. Futures traders use all of these data 
and more to try and accurately price futures contracts, but they are still likely to be 
conservative because of the limited history of data from which to build their models.  
Note here that this thesis does not attempt to find the true value of a new power 
plant in ERCOT. It ignores many aspects of the assets true costs and revenues, including 
ancillary services, peak/off-peak generation, plant downtime for maintenance, and ramp 
up costs, to name a few. Instead, this thesis seeks to frame the problem in its simplest 
terms – if a generator bought futures to hedge all expected generation, what price must 
those futures be for the plant to be “in the money,” and what is the gap? 
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METHODOLOGY 
The futures-based valuation model used in this analysis calculates free cash flows 
(FCF) over the life of the plant. 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡 = (𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡)(1− 𝑇) + 𝐷𝐴𝑡 − 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡 
Where: 
FCF = free cash flows 
t = time 
EBIT = earnings before interest and taxes 
T = tax rate 
DA = depreciation and amortization 
CAPEX = capital expenditures (overnight cost)  
Taxes are assumed at 35% of earnings and property value. The Advanced 
Combined Cycle (ACC) power plant is assumed to have a 20-year life span. The model 
calculates FCFs over the ten years of ERCOT futures contracts currently traded.  
DA is amortized over the useful 20-year lifespan of the plant, or five percent per 
annum. CAPEX uses capital cost estimates provided by the 2012 EIA overnight cost 
estimate of $1,023 per kW constructed, with a nominal capacity of 400MW.45  
The author calculates EBIT as: 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡 = (𝑃𝑂𝑡 × 𝐶𝐹𝑡 × 𝑃𝑡) − (𝐹𝑡 × 𝐻𝑅𝑡 × 𝑃𝑂𝑡 × 𝐶𝐹𝑡) − (𝐹𝑂𝑀𝑡 × 1000 × 𝑃𝑂𝑡)
− (𝑉𝑂𝑀𝑡 × 𝑃𝑂𝑡 × 𝐶𝐹𝑡) 
Where: 
PO = potential plant output (MWh) 
CF = capacity factor 
45 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Updated Capital Cost Estimates for Utility Scale Electricity 
Generating Plants.” 
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P = electricity price (MWh) 
F = fuel price ($/mmbtu) 
HR = heat rate 
FOM = fixed operations and maintenance, selling, general and admin expenses 
($/kw-y) 
VOM = variable operations and maintenance, selling and general and admin 
expenses ($/MWh) 
The author calculates potential plant output by multiplying the theoretical 
generating capacity of the plant (400MW) by the number of hours in a year: 365.25 ×24. Average capacity factor equals the total power produced by a plant as a percent of its 
maximum annual output. In this case, it is 44 percent, based on EIA peak and off-peak 
national estimates.46 Electricity prices equal the annual average of monthly futures 
settlement prices for each year t within ERCOTs northern load zone. The load zone, 
which covers the Dallas/Fort Worth area, was used because it has the highest volume of 
trading within ERCOT, making it most reflective of actual market sentiment.  
Fuel prices are annual averages of monthly futures contract settlement prices at 
Henry Hub. There are likely some small price differentials between the northern load 
zone and Henry Hub due to transportation costs, but again the volume of trading at Henry 
Hub was preferable for market pricing purposes.HR, FOM, and VOM are also provided 
by EIA estimates.47  
Heat rate is calculated as mmbtu used divided by MWh produced. It calculates the 
amount of natural gas needed to generate one MWh of electricity with a given generation 
46 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Average Utilization of the Nation’s Natural Gas Combined-
Cycle Power Plant Fleet Is Rising.” 
47 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Updated Capital Cost Estimates for Utility Scale Electricity 
Generating Plants.” 
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unit. An ACC power plant is assumed to have a heat rate of 6.43mmbtu/MWh, with fixed 
costs of $15.37/kW-y) and variable costs of $3.27/MWh.  
The Gordon Growth model is used to calculate the terminal value in year ten. 
WACC is used for the discount rate, where terminal value equals EBITDA10/WACC, 
where EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization and 
WACC is the weighted average cost of capital. 
 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝐸
𝑉
× 𝑅𝑒 + 𝐷
𝑉
× 𝑅𝑑 × (1− 𝑇) 
Where: 
E = market value of the plant’s equity 
D = market value of the plant’s debt 
V= E+D, or total market value of the firm 
Re = cost of equity 
Rd = cost of debt 
E/V = percentage of financing that is equity 
D/V = percentage of financing that is debt 
T = tax rate 
The plant’s market value (CAPEX) is calculated using the EIA overnight capital 
cost estimate of $1,023 per kW installed: 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 = 𝐸𝐼𝐴𝐶𝐸(𝐼𝐶) where EIACE is the 
EIA cost estimate and IC is the installed capacity of the generation asset.48  
It was assumed that 70% of the project would be financed with debt. For the cost 
of debt, the Federal Reserve corporate debt rating for a baa-rated company of 4.69% as of 
May 29, 2014 was used. For the cost of equity, the author used the 10-year performance 
48 Ibid., Table 1 
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of the Vanguard Utilities Index Fund Admiral Shares (10.27%)49 and added the 20-year 
Treasury bill interest rate on June 2, 2014 (3.1%) as a risk premium, for a total cost of 
equity of 13.37%.50 Tax rate is assumed to be 35%. 
Once FCF for each year is calculated, they are used to determine net present value 
(NPV) and internal rate of return of the project: 
𝑁𝑃𝑉 = �  𝑁
𝑡=1
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡(1−𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)𝑡 − 𝐹𝐶𝐹0 
Net present value calculates the return on all cash flows as if they occurred today, 
putting them in current-day dollars. The author uses the WACC as the discount rate for 
the project. In other words, the NPV will only be positive if its financial gains surpass not 
only the physical project costs, but also the financial costs, namely the opportunity costs 
of equity and actual costs of debt. If the NPV is positive, it suggest that futures markets 
for natural gas and electricity see ACC power plant investment as currently viable. If 
negative, as suspected, it calculates in present day dollars the gap in value. 
The NPV provides the net value for the project with assumptions laid out above. 
To calculate the precise gap between financial market expectations and current market 
realities, the discount rate will be set to zero. This provides the value of the project if 
there are no debt or equity costs and if there are not expectations on rate of return. At this 
point the NPV equation will be used to find the internal rate of return (IRR). Rather than 
solve for NPV the author sets the NPV equal to zero and solves for the discount rate 
(WACC). In this way we will calculate the NPV, IRR and dollar-value equivalent of the 
IRR. 
49 Vanguard, “Vanguard Utilities Index Fund Admiral Shares (VUIAX) Price & Performance.” 
50  
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In addition to determining the valuation gap for the project to be “in the money” 
using the above assumptions, it calculates the required change in either natural gas or 
ERCOT futures prices for the project to come into the money. A modifier is included in 
the model that can increase or decrease fuel and electricity futures prices as a ratio of 
their market price. The electricity price modifier does not affect any other model prices. 
In contrast, the natural gas modifier adjusts electricity prices anytime it approaches a 
price that matches or exceeds the revenues that electricity prices can return. For instance, 
if natural gas prices reached $20/MMBTU, electricity would not be produced at 
$40/MWh because it would cost money. The model could assume that electricity would 
stop being produced at this point. However, as natural gas accounts for 61 percent of 
Texas electricity generation capacity, it is likely generation would continue, but at a 
higher price to account for fuel costs. For this reason, the modifier adjusts electricity 
prices as natural gas prices approach a break-even scenario so that the plant always has 
revenues that exceed fuel expense, variable and fixed costs.51 In the base model, revenues 
exceeded these costs by 19 percent in the most recent year of operations. To stay cash-
flow positive, the natural gas modifier therefore keeps the EBITDA from dropping below 
19 percent of total revenues. Using Excel’s Goal Seek function, this analysis shows the 
“in the money” price required for either natural gas prices or electricity prices. A two-
way table is created to consider scenarios from both electricity and natural gas staying in 
line with futures to one or both doubling. This gives greater insight into the impact of 
both prices on the model. 
While calculations up to this point provide a clear net present valuation of the 
proposed project, they have yet to calculate the revenue needed on a per megawatt-hour 
51 Electric Power Industry Capability by Primary Energy Source, Back to 1990, Texas, 
http://www.eia.gov/state/search/#?1=103&2=224&r=false  
 35 
                                                 
or kilowatt-year basis. In order to calculate kw-y, annual revenue generated by the plant 
is divided by the total capacity of the plant. 
Base inputs for the financial model are outlined in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2. Base Model Inputs 
 
  
Assumptions
Fuel costs See Appendix A
Electricity prices See Appendix A
Heat Rate (mmbtu/MWh) 6.43
Plant capacity (MW) 400
Capacity factor 44%
Variable O&M ($/MWh) $3.27
Fixed O&M ($/kW-y) $15.37
Capital cost ($/kW) $1,023
Property taxes 1%
% of capital in debt 70%
% of capital in equity 30%
Cost of debt 4.69%
cost of equity 13.70%
Depreciation (years) 20
Tax rate 35%
Gas Futures Modifier 1
Electricity Futures Modifier 1
WACC 6.24%
Plant cost $409,200,000
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Chapter 4: Findings 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF ELECTRICITY AND NATURAL GAS FUTURES 
While causation is not part of this analysis, it is worthwhile to note the correlation 
between natural gas and ERCOT futures strike prices. As Figure 4.1 demonstrates, there 
is cyclicality to prices. Both natural gas and ERCOT futures rise in winter months as 
energy demand for heating increases. Summers cause dramatic spikes in ERCOT strike 
prices and a negligible bump in natural gas prices. 
 
Figure 4.1. Comparison, ERCOT NLZ Average Futures Price v. Natural Gas Futures 
Price52 
Over ten years of monthly strike prices, gas futures routinely equal 6-7 percent of 
ERCOT futures prices in summer and 12-13 percent in off-peak months. In fact, when 
annualizing both sets of data, natural gas futures fluctuate from a low of 10.13 percent to 
a high of 11.53 percent of the average annual ERCOT future price (see Table 4.1).  
 
 
 
52 Bloomberg L.P., “Natgas Futures Curve.” & Bloomberg L.P., “ERCOT NLZ Average Futures Price.” 
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Table 4.1. Annualized ERCOT and Natural Gas Futures comparison53 
Natural gas and ERCOT prices clearly follow related price pathways in Texas. Due to 
natural gas generators falling at the margin of the bid stack, they effectively set the price. 
Therefore, as natural gas increases, the price for generation increases. As noted above and 
elsewhere in this analysis, the price of natural gas plays a critical factor in the viability of 
constructing new natural gas generation infrastructure. 
Another interesting note is the limited variance in futures prices. As Table 4.2 
demonstrates, over the next ten years, a buyer can lock in natural gas prices varying less 
than one dollar, from $3.95 to a high of $4.88. The greatest price fluctuation is observed 
in electricity prices, likely at least in part due to the dramatic price differences during 
summer/peak periods versus non-peak periods.  
Table 4.2. Futures Descriptive Statistics 
Annualizing the data reduces standard deviation, but ultimately the averages 
shifted minimally less than 0.2 percent; ERCOT futures skewed down 9 cents and natural 
gas averages increased by a penny.  
53 Ibid. 
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Average Annual ERCOT Future Price 44.98$  40.27$ 39.02$ 38.59$ 37.93$ 37.35$ 38.36$ 39.32$ 39.83$ 40.29$ 
Average Annual Henry Hub Futures Price 4.55$    4.19$   4.13$   4.18$   4.24$   4.31$   4.41$   4.50$   4.56$   4.61$   
Market Implied Heat Rate 9.87      9.62     9.46     9.23     8.95     8.67     8.69     8.74     8.74     8.73     
Average Median Max Min SD
ERCOT NLZ Monthly Futures 39.50$           36.13$           74.00$           30.90$           9.43$      
ERCOT NLZ Unweighted Annualized Futures 39.59$           39.17$           44.98$           37.35$           2.13$      
Henry Hub Monthly Futures 4.36$             4.39$             4.88$             3.95$             0.25$      
Henry Hub Unweighted Annualized Futures 4.37$             4.36$             4.61$             4.13$             0.18$      
Natural Gas as % of ERCOT Price Monthly 11.53% 12.47% 13.93% 6.09% 2.15%
Natural Gas as % of ERCOT Price Annualized 11.05% 11.30% 11.53% 10.13% 0.52%
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MODEL RESULTS 
This model forecasts a minimum of $153.96/kw-Y is needed to make the project 
attractive to investors. The project would require $102/kW-Y just to break even, and this 
fails to provide a return to investors above their initial capital outlay. It would be better 
for investors to place their capital in a utility index fund rather than take the risk of 
building a combined cycle power plant in the ERCOT market. Using the methodology 
outlined in Chapter 3, we find this project deeply “out of the money.” See Table 4.3 
below. 
Table 4.3. Free Cash Flows, NPV, IRR and $/kW-Y 
 
In this scenario, earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA) are low enough that depreciation of the plant allows for a tax benefit that 
cannot be fully realized by this project alone. To get full benefit from the tax benefit 
carrying forward, this plant must be associated with a larger firm that can fully capitalize 
on the loss.  
This model also assumes the company can get ten full years of generation 
revenues and sell the asset for the full value minus depreciation, or the terminal value at 
In 000s Startup 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
+Generation EBITDA 13,013$ 9,401$     8,067$     6,863$     5,305$     3,699$     4,221$     4,854$     5,044$     5,188$      
-Depreciation 20,460$ 20,460$   20,460$   20,460$   20,460$   20,460$   20,460$   20,460$   20,460$   20,460$    
EBIT (7,447)$  (11,059)$ (12,393)$ (13,597)$ (15,155)$ (16,761)$ (16,239)$ (15,606)$ (15,416)$ (15,272)$  
-Property TAXES (3,887)$  (3,683)$    (3,478)$    (3,274)$    (3,069)$    (2,864)$    (2,660)$    (2,455)$    (2,251)$    (2,046)$     
-TAXES 2,606$    3,871$     4,337$     4,759$     5,304$     5,866$     5,684$     5,462$     5,395$     5,345$      
TAX CARRY FORWARD -$        188$        1,047$     2,532$     4,768$     7,769$     10,793$   13,800$   16,945$   20,244$    
NOPAT (8,728)$  (10,683)$ (10,486)$ (9,579)$    (8,152)$    (5,989)$    (2,422)$    1,201$     4,674$     8,272$      
+Depreciation 20,460$ 20,460$   20,460$   20,460$   20,460$   20,460$   20,460$   20,460$   20,460$   20,460$    
-CAPEX (409,200)$ -$        -$         -$         -$         -$         -$         -$         -$         -$         -$          
Free Cash Flow (409,200)$  11,732$ 9,777$     9,974$     10,881$   12,308$   14,471$   18,038$   21,661$   25,134$   28,732$    
+Terminal Value 204,600$ 
DCF (409,200)$  11,732$ 9,777$     9,974$     10,881$   12,308$   14,471$   18,038$   21,661$   25,134$   233,332$ 
NPV (186,436)$ 
IRR -1.3%
$/kW-Y 91.83$      
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the end of year 10 (2023). At $204 million, this is nearly 56 percent of the entire positive 
free cash flows generated from the project. In a real market setting, there is no guarantee 
that this terminal value will be the realized value, and the fact that it accounts for nearly 
56 percent of the FCFs raises a legitimate question. 
Net $/kW-Y after cash flows is $91.83. Note this is much higher than the net 
revenue of $24/kW-Y estimated by the IMM, but still below the $105 - $135/kW-Y 
threshold it argues is the entry point. Note this comparison is not 1:1, as the IMM study 
examines net revenue including carrying costs, whereas this model is showing $/kW-Y 
after all free cash flows.  
Even with these differences, however, this model does not appear to be 
inconsistent with the IMM findings. The internal rate of return is negative, but it is close 
to break even. In fact, if one sets the $/kW-Y to $105 and uses Goal Seek in Excel to 
determine the IRR, it produces a positive result of 0.3 percent, or nearly break-even. This 
is less than required to overcome the weighted average cost of capital – NPV is still 
negative $140 million – and return a reasonable profit, but it does show a certain level of 
agreement between the IMM model built on historical prices in the ERCOT market and 
this model, which is built on the opinions of speculators in the futures market.  
HOW GAS AND ELECTRICITY FUTURES AFFECT NPV 
In this analysis, electricity prices are the main drivers of profitability. To become 
profitable based on natural gas prices alone, they need to increase by a factor of 5.3, from 
the current average of $4.37/MMBTU to $23.29/MMBTU, raising the revenue to 
$153.96/kW-Y, the break-even revenue. Electricity, while still valuing the project as 
negative in the current market, only has to rise by a factor of 1.8 of current average strike 
prices. See Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4. Two-variable Table, NPV at Different Electricity and Natural Gas Prices 
 
Note in the model that when gas prices are twice futures prices (with a modifier of 
2), ERCOT futures prices do not influence the valuation model until the modifier is 50 
percent greater than base (1.5). The natural gas modifier automatically rises to maintain 
positive EBITDA cash flows. It is only when ERCOT prices have risen by 50 percent that 
their revenues exceed the modifier and being to influence the two-variable table. 
Likewise with a 1.5 natural gas modifier, it is not until an ERCOT futures modifier of 1.2 
is applied that the 19 percent EBITDA adjustment stops influencing the model. 
As Figure 4.5 demonstrates, until the average price of electricity futures reaches 
between 1.8 and 1.9, or approximately $71.27, on average, a plant could not be built “in 
the money” using financial risk management instruments alone. The gap between current 
futures prices is too great. $71.27 is not an unreasonable price for a market that has a 
$5,000 market cap. However, futures do not currently come close to this price. Over 118 
months of futures, only a single month had futures prices greater than $71 and only eight 
had electricity prices exceed $60. The current average monthly price of $39.50 is not 
even enough to make the project viable if its capacity factor was 100 percent. Even at 100 
percent capacity factor, the average futures price would need to rise 23 percent to $48.95. 
20 months, or 16.9 percent of all observations, met or exceeded this price. The ability for 
a plant to achieve 100 percent capacity factor within a single year, let alone 10, is 
(186,436)$  1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2
1 (186,436)$  (176,427)$  (199,364)$  (193,102)$  (188,313)$  (183,525)$  (178,736)$  (173,947)$  (169,159)$  (164,370)$  (159,581)$  
1.1 (196,504)$  (192,673)$  (173,449)$  (178,795)$  (195,030)$  (183,525)$  (178,736)$  (173,947)$  (169,159)$  (164,370)$  (159,581)$  
1.2 (176,817)$  (193,467)$  (195,056)$  (183,062)$  (179,492)$  (193,032)$  (178,736)$  (173,947)$  (169,159)$  (164,370)$  (159,581)$  
1.3 (147,814)$  (168,228)$  (188,643)$  (194,534)$  (189,376)$  (181,440)$  (190,725)$  (182,873)$  (169,159)$  (164,370)$  (159,581)$  
1.4 (118,811)$  (139,225)$  (159,640)$  (180,055)$  (192,707)$  (192,219)$  (179,688)$  (190,240)$  (183,598)$  (175,185)$  (159,581)$  
1.5 (89,807)$    (110,222)$  (130,637)$  (151,052)$  (171,467)$  (188,953)$  (192,565)$  (186,079)$  (187,496)$  (183,720)$  (170,361)$  
1.6 (60,804)$    (81,219)$    (101,634)$  (122,049)$  (142,464)$  (162,878)$  (183,293)$  (191,023)$  (189,383)$  (190,081)$  (184,636)$  
1.7 (31,801)$    (52,216)$    (72,631)$    (93,046)$    (113,460)$  (133,875)$  (154,290)$  (174,705)$  (188,193)$  (190,596)$  (182,782)$  
1.8 (2,798)$     (23,213)$    (43,628)$    (64,043)$    (84,457)$    (104,872)$  (125,287)$  (145,702)$  (166,117)$  (184,439)$  (189,054)$  
1.9 26,205$     5,790$      (14,625)$    (35,039)$    (55,454)$    (75,869)$    (96,284)$    (116,699)$  (137,114)$  (157,528)$  (177,943)$  
2 55,208$     34,793$     14,379$     (6,036)$     (26,451)$    (46,866)$    (67,281)$    (87,696)$    (108,110)$  (128,525)$  (148,940)$  
ERCOT 
Future 
Price 
Modifier
Natural Gas Futures Modifier
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unrealistic. Routine maintenance, off-peak prices that fall below the plants clearing price, 
and other factors keep capacity factors well below theoretical limits.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
New natural gas extraction methods have dramatically reduced electricity costs. 
As a state heavily invested in natural gas electricity generation, this new paradigm affects 
Texas greater than most. Texas is growing. Substantial capacity has been built over the 
past decade, albeit not enough to meet reserve demand. However, the relatively young 
age of much of ERCOTs generation capacity makes it much more efficient. Combined 
with low gas prices, the generation cost curve only increases when demand nearly 
reaches full capacity. A lean, deregulated market contributes to keeping the prices as low 
as possible. 
These parameters also work against the essential need that ERCOT be reliable. 
Lower prices at the cost of reliability raise brownout or rolling blackout risk for 
businesses and residents. This downtime risk, if great enough, will become a factor in 
business decisions. Clearly a balance needs to be struck between reliability and costs; a 
perfectly reliable system would cost far too much to recoup the benefits to business, 
industry and the Texas economy, while an unreliable system would cost far too much in 
downtime and unpredictability. 
ERCOTs moves to raise peak power pricing to $9,000/MWh by 2015 and the 
ORDC which went into effect in June 2014 have reduced the revenue gap while 
preserving the benefits of a deregulated market. Generators have greater ability to recoup 
costs even as the market is left mainly untouched. This study’s author hypothesized that 
the futures market offered a better determinant of the revenue gap for new generation 
investment. Multiple market changes meant to bolster generator’s returns were passed by 
the PUC and are being instated over the next 2 years. Assuming these changes would be 
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reflected in market prices, the author believed they might offer a way to conservatively 
estimate future generation revenues in the ERCOT. 
This hypothesis in many ways was validated. Although this study was consistent 
with the IMM analysis in that it found a significant gap between expenses and revenues, 
it found the gap was indeed smaller than IMM estimates. This model forecasts a 
minimum of $105/kW-Y is needed to break even for CONE for an ACC, and $154/kw-Y 
is needed to attract investment, similar to the IMM estimates of $105-$135 per kW-year. 
Unlike the IMM analysis, this model found expected revenues to average roughly $92 per 
kW-year compared to the IMM estimate of $42.  
Another validation of this method comes from current market activity. In spite of 
the gap in market capacity, there has been little new investment, the recent Panda project 
in Temple being a notable exception. If traditional power plant financing was viable, and 
the current lack of capacity was as great as ERCOT and its analysts believe, new 
generation would get built. With the limited investment taking place in ERCOT, one 
must conclude one or both of these assumptions is incorrect. From the analysis set forth 
in this thesis, we can conclude the first premise – traditional power plant financing is 
currently viable – is not a valid statement. While traditional financing is not viable 
however, it is much closer than the IMM analysis, which estimates revenues exceeding 
2.6 times current revenue are needed to incent new construction. From this analysis, 
revenues 1.14 times current anticipated revenues would be break-even and 1.7 times 
current anticipated revenues would be sufficient to provide adequate returns to draw 
investment. This may explain how projects like Panda, which had “an uphill battle, in a 
very difficult financial market” were only able to finance the project through unusual 
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equity financing methods.54 It is doubtful financing would occur if anticipated revenues 
were so far out of the money as the IMM forecasts. 
A number of market changes could shrink or eliminate this gap – natural gas or 
electricity futures could rise, capacity factor could increase, or revenues from ancillary 
services or the new adder, to name a few – but the most powerful thrust will likely come 
from higher average electricity prices. Revenues are insufficient to incent new generation 
capacity. Barring out-migration from the state, significant success from demand response, 
or some other event or technology that reduces or levels power demand, new generation 
units need built in Texas. If nothing else is done, scarcity will increase the frequency of 
$7,000/MWh prices for power, eventually drawing the economics up to the point where 
new generation capital investment becomes feasible. 
  
54 Panda PowerFunds, “Panda PowerFunds Press Release.” 
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 Chapter 6: Future Analysis 
FUTURE MARKET CHANGES 
ERCOT is continuing to develop as a market. As it experiences a year with the 
new ORDC and it moves from a $7,000/MWh to a $9,000/MWh cap in 2015, market 
dynamics will correspond. These changes will directly influence electricity prices in real-
time, DAM, and futures markets, most likely upward. While futures markets still show a 
gap between generation revenues and the amount needed to attract new investment, this 
author expects that gap to narrow within the year. 
In addition to new market rules that may drive up revenues, natural gas is likely to 
increase in price and volatility as exports grow and new markets, such as transportation, 
are explored for their growth opportunities. This will affect the bid stack, increasing the 
price for electricity throughout ERCOT. 
In addition to the benefit of repeating the study a year from now once new market 
rules have more strongly influenced futures, it would be advantageous to incorporate 
ancillary services into future studies. Ancillary services were left out of this study 
because they add little to the overall revenues for gas-fired generation in ERCOT.55 Even 
so, as the gap narrows between CONE and potential investment returns, these additional 
revenue sources will require a closer look. 
MODEL CHANGES 
This model uses an advanced combined cycle power plant for its analysis. ACCs 
have much higher heat rates than simple-cycle turbines, giving them high revenue 
55 Potomac Economics, Ltd., 2012 State of the Market Report for the ERCOT Wholesale Electricity 
Markets.p 79. 
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relative to their heat rate. The assumption was the higher capital cost would be 
outweighed by the more efficient heat rate. A simple-cycle turbine, however, may offer 
improved ROI as capital costs are lower. Additionally, something that was not considered 
in this study, a simple-cycle turbine takes much less time to build, reducing the capital at 
risk until that asset starts generating.  
This model also assumes a flat bid price for futures contracts. The natural gas 
market trades at sufficiently high volumes as to make this reasonable. However, energy 
contracts at the volume needed to hedge an entire power plant would undoubtedly affect 
market prices. That is to say, initial bids would push the sales price upwards. Even so, 
this model uses futures contracts as a proxy for future price, not as an actual transaction. 
It is used to account for investor sentiment in light of new market rules. 
Finally, to stay conservative, this model uses average daily contract prices and 
average capacity factor. A less conservative, but possibly more accurate, method would 
be to compare peak and off-peak contracts to peak and off-peak capacity factors, as ACC 
capacity differs substantially between these two periods, as do energy prices. 
FEDERAL RULES 
In addition to the considerations outlined above, new federal rules on CO2 prices 
and emissions targets for power plants are likely to dramatically change the market. 
TCEQ and other State level bodies are still determining how to implement these rules. 
Once they are established, it would be useful to re-examine this model. 
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Appendix A: ERCOT North Load Zone Average Future Electricity 
price and Henry Hub Natural Gas Future price56 
56 Bloomberg L.P., “Natgas Futures Curve.” & Bloomberg L.P., “ERCOT NLZ Average Futures Price.” 
PERIOD ERCOT NLZ Avg Future $ Nat Gas Futures $ PERIOD ERCOT NLZ Avg Future $ Nat Gas Futures $ PERIOD ERCOT NLZ Avg Future $ Nat Gas Futures $
MAR 14 41.2 4.855 MAY 17 32.85 4.016 JUL 20 50.8 4.306
APR 14 39 4.541 JUN 17 39.6 4.041 AUG 20 60.3 4.336
MAY 14 37.9 4.464 JUL 17 49.55 4.069 SEP 20 39.9 4.339
JUN 14 46.15 4.484 AUG 17 63.1 4.084 OCT 20 31.65 4.375
JUL 14 58.7 4.519 SEP 17 39.9 4.082 NOV 20 32.1 4.461
AUG 14 74 4.508 OCT 17 31.75 4.11 DEC 20 33.65 4.645
SEP 14 42.4 4.482 NOV 17 32.4 4.195 JAN 21 36.9 4.737
OCT 14 37.2 4.495 DEC 17 33.45 4.37 FEB 21 36.95 4.702
NOV 14 36.05 4.544 JAN 18 35.8 4.499 MAR 21 35.6 4.617
DEC 14 37.15 4.653 FEB 18 35.75 4.469 APR 21 33.8 4.292
JAN 15 40.8 4.744 MAR 18 34.2 4.404 MAY 21 33.2 4.315
FEB 15 40.7 4.697 APR 18 32.4 4.049 JUN 21 40.2 4.348
MAR 15 38.25 4.58 MAY 18 32.25 4.064 JUL 21 51.8 4.389
APR 15 34.4 4.005 JUN 18 38.5 4.087 AUG 21 62.8 4.416
MAY 15 33.25 3.96 JUL 18 49.35 4.115 SEP 21 40.9 4.421
JUN 15 40.65 3.974 AUG 18 62 4.13 OCT 21 32.15 4.457
JUL 15 56.5 3.996 SEP 18 38.95 4.132 NOV 21 33.05 4.543
AUG 15 65.25 4.001 OCT 18 31.3 4.164 DEC 21 34.45 4.727
SEP 15 37.2 3.984 NOV 18 31.8 4.26 JAN 22 37.35 4.819
OCT 15 32.05 4.005 DEC 18 32.8 4.448 FEB 22 37.4 4.784
NOV 15 31.4 4.057 JAN 19 35.35 4.553 MAR 22 36 4.699
DEC 15 32.8 4.241 FEB 19 35.25 4.523 APR 22 33.95 4.359
JAN 16 35.65 4.393 MAR 19 33.5 4.458 MAY 22 33.8 4.355
FEB 16 36.15 4.368 APR 19 32.2 4.118 JUN 22 40.75 4.385
MAR 16 35.8 4.311 MAY 19 31.8 4.135 JUL 22 51.65 4.426
APR 16 33.6 3.951 JUN 19 37.6 4.159 AUG 22 64.85 4.466
MAY 16 33.05 3.961 JUL 19 49.35 4.189 SEP 22 41.4 4.474
JUN 16 40.5 3.985 AUG 19 59.85 4.211 OCT 22 32.55 4.52
JUL 16 49.45 4.011 SEP 19 38.65 4.215 NOV 22 33.45 4.605
AUG 16 65.6 4.026 OCT 19 30.9 4.251 DEC 22 34.75 4.79
SEP 16 40.45 4.023 NOV 19 31.2 4.345 JAN 23 37.95 4.882
OCT 16 32.3 4.051 DEC 19 32.55 4.533 FEB 23 37.85 4.847
NOV 16 32.25 4.138 JAN 20 36.35 4.629 MAR 23 36.45 4.762
DEC 16 33.4 4.299 FEB 20 36.1 4.599 APR 23 34.15 4.422
JAN 17 36.3 4.44 MAR 20 34.65 4.534 MAY 23 34.4 4.407
FEB 17 36.4 4.413 APR 20 33.1 4.214 JUN 23 41.2 4.437
MAR 17 35 4.355 MAY 20 32.3 4.237 JUL 23 52.3 4.478
APR 17 32.8 4.005 JUN 20 39.4 4.266 AUG 23 65.55 4.517
SEP 23 41.7 4.527
OCT 23 33.05 4.579
NOV 23 33.85 4.664
DEC 23 35 4.849
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Appendix B: EBITDA Calculations 
Appendix A shows the results of base assumptions. Note the price w/fuel modifier 
line only applies to the model when creating scenarios that test various fuel prices. 
 
  
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Potential Plant Output (MWh) 3,506,400                3,506,400           3,506,400           3,506,400           3,506,400           3,506,400           3,506,400           3,506,400           3,506,400           3,506,400           
Capacity Factor 44% 44% 44% 44% 44% 44% 44% 44% 44% 44%
Actual Plant Output (MWh) 1,542,816                1,542,816           1,542,816           1,542,816           1,542,816           1,542,816           1,542,816           1,542,816           1,542,816           1,542,816           
Annual Avg Elect Price ($/MWh) 44.98$                      40.27$                 39.02$                 38.59$                 37.93$                 37.35$                 38.36$                 39.32$                 39.83$                 40.29$                 
Price w/fuel modfier -$                          -$                     -$                     -$                     -$                     -$                     -$                     -$                     -$                     -$                     
Annual Avg Fuel Price ($/MMBTU) 4.55$                        4.19$                   4.13$                   4.18$                   4.24$                   4.31$                   4.41$                   4.50$                   4.56$                   4.61$                   
Merchant Energy Revenue 69,388,150$            62,130,486$      60,195,538$      59,539,841$      58,511,297$      57,624,178$      59,179,850$      60,658,382$      61,442,647$      62,156,200$      
Merchant Fuel Expense (45,182,038)$          (41,536,325)$     (40,935,320)$     (41,483,417)$     (42,013,326)$     (42,731,722)$     (43,765,914)$     (44,611,620)$     (45,205,185)$     (45,774,776)$     
VOM Cost (5,045,008)$             (5,045,008)$       (5,045,008)$       (5,045,008)$       (5,045,008)$       (5,045,008)$       (5,045,008)$       (5,045,008)$       (5,045,008)$       (5,045,008)$       
FOM Cost (6,148,000)$             (6,148,000)$       (6,148,000)$       (6,148,000)$       (6,148,000)$       (6,148,000)$       (6,148,000)$       (6,148,000)$       (6,148,000)$       (6,148,000)$       
EBITDA 13,013,103.6$        9,401,152.8$     8,067,209.6$     6,863,415.9$     5,304,962.2$     3,699,447.4$     4,220,928.2$     4,853,754.0$     5,044,453.8$     5,188,415.3$     
Gross Revenue/kW-Y 173.47$               155.33$           150.49$           148.85$           146.28$           144.06$           147.95$           151.65$           153.61$           155.39$           
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Glossary 
AREP  Affiliate retail electricity provider 
CAISO California Independent System Operator 
CPUC  California Public Utility Commission 
CREP  Competitive retail electric providers 
ERCOT Electric Reliability Council of Texas 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GWh  Gigawatt hours 
IOU  Investor-owned utilities  
ISO  Independent system operators 
kWh  kilowatt hours 
LNG  liquefied natural gas 
LSE  load serving entities 
MMBtu 1 million British thermal units 
MWh  megawatthours 
PG&E  Pacific Gas and Electric 
PJM  Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection 
PTB  Price-to-Beat 
PUC  Public Utility Commission 
PX  Power Exchange 
REP  Retail electricity provider 
SCE  Southern California Edison 
SDG&E San Diego Gas and Electric 
T&D  Transmission and distribution 
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TDSP  Transmission and distribution service provider 
TXU  Texas Utilities Electric Company
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